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Abstract
The main objective of work package 7 is to provide improved support for architecting and designing
secure services in Future Internet applications. This report presents advances about the prototypes for
secure architecture and design, which all target specific modeling challenges for trust, access control
and reputation in FI applications. This spectrum reflects the different concerns that impact the security
of software architecture. It also reflects the challenges that arise in a context where applications have
to run in constantly evolving environments.
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Executive summary
This deliverable focuses on methods and tools to model secure and adaptive architectures for software
applications deployed on the Future Internet. It is organized around the different prototypes that have been
developed by the WP partners to build secure service architectures and design. The proposed solutions
are ordered according to their level of abstraction, from solutions that are the closest to requirements to
solutions that are closer to the running system:
• Section 2 analyzes the ISO 27001 demands for system development and documentation with regard
to cloud computing systems. Based on these insights, we provide a method that relies upon existing
requirements engineering methods. Moreover, our method relies on patterns for several security
tasks, e.g., context descriptions, threat analysis and policy definition. Our method can ease the
effort of establishing a cloud-specific Information Security Management System (ISMS) and can
produce the necessary documentation for an ISO 27001 compliant ISMS;
• Section 3 introduces a formal modeling and security verification technique that leverages model
finding to verify that the security critical parts of a software architecture adhere to their security
requirements. By making use of abstraction, the technique supports compositional verification and
iterative refinement of these models. This, in turn, promotes reuse of (partial) verification results and
enables integration in a larger software development process;
• Section 4 presents an extension of security features of UWE [28]. The aim is to be more specific
about web applications (secure downloads, cross-site request forgery (CSRF) prevention, panic
mode, under attack mode and so on). Another area is the transformation of graphical UWE models
(in UML) to a textual DSL written in Scala. This DSL, called TextualUWE, can then be easily checked
by functions written in functional Scala;
• Section 5 proposes a novel model-driven methodology, called ActionGUI, for developing secure
data-management applications. In this deliverable we report on several applications that demon-
strate the usefulness of our approach and the associated tools;
• Section 6 reports on a prototype that performs an automatic translation of declarative, rule-based
ATL transformations into transformation models, and subsequently uses to them existing model sat-
isfiability checkers for OCL-annotated metamodels to verify the translated ATL transformations with
respect to the desired pre and postconditions. The resulting encoding of ATL into OCL-constrained
models can be used for the analysis of various properties, in particular the correct mapping of secu-
rity properties by transformations;
• Section 7 proposes an integration of intrusion detection capacities in a models@runtime framework.
This enables detecting nodes in a distributed system that are trying to corrupt the application’s
model. The IDS can trigger reconfiguration to secure the application and the new model is dissemi-
nated through a secure private polling to secure the reconfiguration process itself;
• Section 8 proposes trust to be the main driver for deciding whether a self-adaptive system must
change during its execution. A system can sense the environment, inspect the trust relationships
among its nodes and components, and change itself as a response to changes in this information;
• Section 9 summarizes the relationships between the work developed in WP7 and the other work-
packages.
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1 Introduction
NESSoS WP7 focuses on methods and tools to model secure and adaptive architectures for software
applications deployed on the Future Internet [19]. A major characteristic of Future Internet applications is
"the fading boundary between development time and runtime" [15]. Consequently, the system architecture
is designed in the early development phases, but then constantly evolves through the whole development
lifecycle, including in post-deployment phases. This is reflected in the contributions integrated in WP7,
which propose model-based concepts to integrate different security concerns in software architecture at
in requirements definition phases, at design time and at runtime.
The workpackage contributions can thus be organized according to three dimensions: the security
concern modeled and analyzed by a given technique; the phase in the lifecycle at which a given tech-
nique proposes to model and analyze security concerns; the formalism used to model security and the
system. Figure 1.1 represents the different solutions the workpackage’s contributions investigate in each
dimension. The tools and prototypes in WP7 support security analysis according to trust, access con-
trol or security standards for information systems. These security concerns are modeled in early design
models, detailed analysis models and for runtime deployment, using one or a combination of the following
formalisms: UML, Secure UML, ADL (an architecture description language) or OCL.
Design 
phase
Security 
concern
Modeling 
formalism
early 
analysis
detailed 
design
deployment
UML and 
profiles
Problem 
Frames
Secure
UML
ADL
RBAC
IDS
ISO 27001 
standard for FI
OCL
ATL
Ecore
navigation 
access control
trust
Figure 1.1: Modeling secure architectures: three dimensions explored in WP7 contributions
This deliverable focuses on the presentation of tools and prototypes that support the modeling methods
and techniques integrated in WP7. The position of each prototype with respect to the dimensions of Figure
1.1 is explicitly stated at the beginning of each section, in a table that summarizes the following information:
• purpose of the prototype: this summarizes the main modeling intention that the prototype can sup-
port, as well as the main functionality the prototype proposes;
• modeling formalism: prototypes use general purpose formalisms such as UML (sometimes extended
with profiles), OCL, Ecore, as well as specific languages for architecture description (ADLs) or model
transformation (ATL);
• security concern: at the architecture level, the different prototypes address access control issues
(in web navigation, pervasive systems and information systems), trust and reputation issues or the
adaptation of standard information systems security concerns to cloud infrastructures.
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1.1 Integration activities
The development of prototypes to support model-based secure software architecture, fosters the integra-
tion efforts of the network. In particular, this deliverable presents the following prototypes developed by
two or more partners :
• ATOS and INRIA integrate their expertise in formal logics modeling and model transformation in
a prototype that aims at verifying the preservation of security properties through automatic model
transformation (Section 6);
• UDE and SINTEF collaborated on the PACTS method described in Section 2, to integrate the
CORAS risk analysis method;
• IMDEA and ETH have integrated their expertise in formal modeling and security to develop a toolbox
for the automatic generation of secure GUIs (Section 5);
• UMA and INRIA have integrated the trust and reputation framework developed at UMA into the
Kevoree framework to support trust-based reasoning for runtime reconfiguration (Section 8).
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2 A pattern-based method for establishing a cloud-
specific information security management system
Purpose of the prototype ISO 27001 realization for cloud computing systems
Modeling formalism UML-based
Security concern Cloud-specific security management compliant to ISO 27001
Partner(s) UDE
This chapter presents a summary of our publication in Springer’s Requirements Engineering Journal
at the special issue for security, privacy and services in the cloud [3]. In this work, we developed a method
called PACTS that supports the cloud-specific establishment of an information security management sys-
tem for cloud computing systems. The work is the continuation of our contribution to D7.3.
2.1 Introduction
The possibility of quickly acquiring or disposing of resources such as storage and memory provides a great
attraction for a variety of customers. Cloud computing systems (or simply clouds) provide the means for
this kind of acquisition or deposition. However, potential customers are still reserved when it comes to
using cloud resources. In 2009, a study was conducted by the International Data Corporation 1 about
this issue. It pointed out that security is a significant barrier for the acceptance of clouds in companies.
The lack of trust in cloud security lies within the nature of clouds: storing and managing critical data
and executing sensitive IT-processes is performed beyond the company’s/customer’s control. To gain
the customer’s trust and to illustrate that security is taken seriously, cloud providers have to certify their
services with respect to security. One way of doing that is to turn to standards that put security at the
center of interest. Several well-known companies have adopted this approach such as Microsoft2, Amazon
3, Google 45, and Salesforce 6. The aim of the ISO 27001 standard is to establish an Information Security
Management System (ISMS). To use this standard for cloud computing systems is in accordance with
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)7. The current version of the standard does not
take cloud specific security issues into consideration. The BSI recommends to consider cloud specific
threats when dealing with cloud systems. The Cloud Security Alliance [8] and Gartner [14] have identified
several of these threats. We take their findings and use them in our work. Assembling an ISMS according
to the ISO 27001 standard is non-trivial task. This is supported by the fact that descriptions for system
development and documentation are rather sparse. For example, the required input for the scope and
boundaries description is to consider “characteristics of the business, the organization, its location, assets
and technology” [21, p. 4]. No further information beyond that is given.
We present our PAttern-based method for establishing a Cloud-specific informaTion Security man-
agement system (PACTS). We analyzed the activities demanded by the standard to build an ISMS and
present patterns for these incorporating existing security requirements approaches, where applicable. We
also provide a structured method that shows how the different elements described above have to be ap-
plied in order to create the required ISMS documentation admissible for certification. We use existing
research on context descriptions for clouds in our method in order to provide a domain-specific approach.
The patterns define stakeholders and technological artifacts that are used in the context description and
all subsequent patterns and models, e.g., security policies. Furthermore, we provide relations from these
patterns to cloud-specific lists of threats proposed by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [8] and Gartner
[14]. In addition, our approach provides a structured refinement of the cloud system’s and stakeholder’s
1https://www-304.ibm.com/isv/library/pdfs/cloud_idc.pdf
2http://www.windowsazure.com/en-us/support/trust-center/compliance/
3http://aws.amazon.com/security/
4http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com.br/2012/05/google-apps-receives-iso-27001.html
5http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240150882/Google-Apps-for-Business-wins-ISO-27001-certification
6http://www.salesforce.com/platform/cloud-infrastructure/security.jsp
7https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Minimum_information/
SecurityRecommendationsCloudComputingProviders.pdf
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information to assess the threats for a particular instantiation of our cloud pattern. Our method uses
this information for risk assessment and security control selection according to the ISO 27001 standard.
Moreover, the ISO 27001 standard demands consideration of privacy and legal compliance. We inte-
grated existing pattern-based research for compliance and privacy requirements into our approach in
order to satisfy these demands.
2.2 Background
We illustrate our cloud system analysis pattern in Sect. 2.2.1 and we introduce the 27001 standard in
particular in Sect. 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Cloud System Analysis Pattern
We propose patterns for a structured domain knowledge elicitation. Depending on the kind of domain
knowledge that we have to elicit for a software engineering process, we always have certain elements
that require consideration. For this work we use a specific context elicitation pattern, the so-called cloud
system analysis pattern [4]. We base our approach on Jackson’s work on Problem Frames [23] that con-
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Figure 2.1: Cloud system analysis pattern taken from [4]
siders requirements engineering from the point of view of a machine in its environment: The machine is
the software to be built and requirements specify the effect the machine is supposed to have on the en-
vironment. Any given environment considers certain elements, e.g., stakeholders or technical elements.
Jackson [23], who describes Problem Frames as follows: “A problem frame is a kind of pattern. It de-
fines an intuitively identifiable problem class in terms of its context and the characteristics of its domains,
interfaces and requirement.”. We were also inspired by Fowler [11], who developed patterns for the anal-
ysis phase of a given software engineering process. His patterns describe organizational structures and
processes, e.g., accounting, planning, and trading.
Our patterns for the analysis phase differ from patterns concerning solutions for the design phase of
software engineering like the Gang of Four patterns [13] or the security patterns by Schumacher et al.
[39]. The reason is that we provide a means for a structured elicitation of domain knowledge for cloud
computing systems. We do not provide solutions for the implementation phase of clouds.
We present a short introduction of our so-called Cloud System Analysis Pattern (or short: Cloud
Pattern) [4] in the following. We created the pattern for cloud-specific context establishment and asset
identification compliant to the ISO 27000 series of standards. A Cloud (see Fig. 2.1) is embedded into an
environment consisting of two parts, namely the Direct System Environment and the Indirect System En-
vironment. The Direct System Environment contains stakeholders and other systems that directly interact
with the Cloud, i.e. they are connected to the cloud by associations. Moreover, associations between
stakeholders in the Direct and Indirect System Environment exist, but not between stakeholders in the
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Indirect System Environment and the Cloud. Typically, the Indirect System Environment is a significant
source for compliance requirements. The Cloud Provider owns a Pool consisting of Resources, which are
divided into Hardware and Software resources. The provider offers its resources as Services, i.e. IaaS,
PaaS, or SaaS. The boxes Pool and Service in Fig. 2.1 are cloud concepts and it is not necessary to
instantiate them. Instead, the specialized cloud services such as IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS and specialized
Resources are instantiated. The Cloud Developer represents a software developer assigned by the Cloud
Customer. The developer prepares and maintains an IaaS or PaaS offer. The IaaS offer is a virtualized
hardware, in some cases it is equipped with a basic operating system. The Cloud Developer deploys a
set of software named Cloud Software Stack (e.g. web servers, applications, databases) into the IaaS in
order to offer the functionality required to build a PaaS. In our pattern PaaS consists of an IaaS, a Cloud
Software Stack and a cloud programming interface (CPI), which we subsume as Software Product. The
Cloud Customer hires a Cloud Developer to prepare and create SaaS offers based on the CPI, finally
used by the End Customers. SaaS processes and stores Data input and output from the End Customers.
The Cloud Provider, Cloud Customer, Cloud Developer, and End Customer are part of the Direct System
Environment. Hence, we categorize them as direct stakeholders. The Legislator and the Domain (and
possibly other stakeholders) are part of the Indirect System Environment. Therefore, we categorize them
as indirect stakeholders. We also provide templates for each stakeholder that describe their attributes in
detail.
2.2.2 The ISO 27001 Standard
The ISO 27001 defines the requirements for establishing and maintaining an ISMS [21]. In particular, the
standard describes the process of creating a model of the entire business risks of a given organization and
specific requirements for the implementation of security controls. The ISO 27001 standard is structured
according to the “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) model, the so-called ISO 27001 process [21]. In the Plan
phase an ISMS is established, in the Do phase the ISMS is implemented and operated, in the Check
phase the ISMS is monitored and reviewed, and in the Act phase the ISMS is maintained and improved.
In the Plan phase, the scope and boundaries of the ISMS, its interested parties, environment, assets,
and all the technology involved are defined. In this phase also the ISMS policies, risk assessments,
evaluations, and controls are defined. Controls in the ISO 27001 are measures to modify risk. The
ISO 27001 standard demands the creation of a set of documents and the certification of an ISO 27001
compliant ISMS is based upon these documents.
Changes in the organization or technology also have to comply with the documented ISMS require-
ments. Furthermore, the standard requires periodic audits to ensure the effectiveness of an ISMS. These
audits are also conducted using documented ISMS requirements. In addition, the ISO 27001 standard
demands that management decisions, providing support for establishing and maintaining an ISMS, are
documented as well. This support has to be documented via management decisions. This has to be
proven as part of a detailed documentation of how each decision was reached and how many resources
are committed to implement this decision.
2.3 Overview of our PACTS Method
Evaluating business benefits against privacy, security, and compliance concerns of clouds is difficult,
because implementation and operational details are often not transparent to cloud customers or end
customers. These stakeholders entrust their data to a cloud provider, which leads to concerns regarding
data integrity, recovery and location, as well as legal issues [14].
We address these concerns by proposing our PACTS method for creating a cloud-specific ISMS com-
pliant to the ISO 27001 standard with a particular focus on legal compliance and privacy. PACTS considers
either the cloud provider or the cloud customer as possible stakeholders, who build an ISMS. The reason
is that these are organizations that should earn the trust of their customers via certifying an ISMS.
Our cloud system analysis pattern (see Sect. 2.2.1) provides a basic structure of a cloud computing
architecture, which considers the relations between stakeholders and the cloud. The pattern can be
instantiated for any given cloud scenario and, if required, can be extended with little effort. The pattern
provides a basis for cloud-specific asset identification, threat analysis, risk management, and control
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Figure 2.2: The steps of our PACTS method concerning security
selection. For example, several threats are already mapped to the cloud pattern and can be analyzed
based upon the patterns instantiation. The instantiated pattern is also the input for our identification of
relevant laws and analysis of privacy requirements.
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Figure 2.3: The steps of PACTS concerning compliance and privacy
Our cloud pattern reduces the effort for creating a description of a cloud. We can simply instantiate
the pattern in order to get a description. The benefit of basing our method on the cloud pattern is also
that knowledge collected using the pattern can be re-used for different instantiations of the pattern. For
example, assets identified using the pattern can be instantiated for different projects, e.g., the Data in the
cloud pattern has been identified as an asset. Hence, all instantiations of Data are assets as well. In
additions, experiences from using our method can also lead to an improved pattern, e.g., the pattern can
be extended with further stakeholders.
We present an overview of our method for establishing a cloud-specific ISMS in this section. In the
remainder of the section we provide detailed descriptions of each step of our PACTS method. We begin
by describing the steps concerning security, depicted in Fig. 2.2.
Step 1: Get Management Commitment - The precondition for building an ISMS is that the manage-
ment commits to it. Thus, we dedicate the first step of our method to get management commitment for the
ISMS and the provision of adequate resources to establish it. We describe the characteristics of the busi-
ness via UML use case diagrams [42]. The use cases are accompanied by our management templates,
which have to be instantiated with relevant information for building the ISMS, e.g., high level security goals,
cloud-specific management concerns, and resource management.
Step 2: Define ISMS scope - The scope for building the ISMS shall be described using the initial use
cases. These are refined using our cloud system analysis pattern for structural description of the cloud
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scenario and a business process notation for behavioral description. In our examples, we choose UML
activity diagrams [42] as business process notations.
Step 3: Identify Assets - The entire ISMS scope description is the input for the asset identification. We
identify all items of value to the cloud stakeholders by iterating over the relations from cloud stakeholders
to cloud elements in the cloud system analysis pattern and activity diagrams. This results in a list of assets
and the stakeholders that own them as an output of this step of the method.
Step 4: Analyze Threats - We conduct a threat analysis using the list of threats released by the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) [8], an industrial consortium that investigated practical security issues with clouds
and the threats that Gartner [14] considers. We propose to identify threats to the previously identified
assets using our cloud system analysis pattern. This activity includes an investigation of vulnerabilities of
cloud components. We use the identified threats as an input for misuse cases. The results of the misuse
cases are specific threats and security requirements.
Step 5: Conduct Risk Assessment - The assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and security requirements
serve as input for our risk assessment. We conduct an asset-based method that uses the previously
elicited knowledge to derive likelihood and consequences scales, as well as acceptable risk levels. This
information is used to determine, which cloud threats cause unacceptable risks.
Step 6: Create Security Policies and Reason about Controls - Controls in the ISO 270001 standard
reduce risks to assets. The reasoning about controls considers the risks to each assets and supports the
decision if a control is needed or not. For each asset, we propose to compile a list that states why a control
in the normative ANNEX A of the ISO 27001 should or should not be applied to that asset. We instantiate
our policy pattern to ease this activity. The policy patterns help to define precisely which elements of the
cloud pattern the control refers to and the security goal the control shall achieve. If the decision is made
that a control has to be introduced, we go back to the previous step of our method in order to adjust the
risk assessment for that particular asset. This information is in turn used to check if the control already
results in an acceptable risk level or if it has to be modified or another control should be introduced. The
resulting information is used to compile the so-called Statement of Applicability, which is a mandatory
document for reasoning about the ISO 27001 controls.
We also have to check carefully if our use cases defined in Step 1 can lead to acceptable risk levels
using reasonable and affordable controls. Hence, we also have to consider changing the use cases in
case acceptable risk levels cannot be achieved with reasonable efforts.
Step 7: Design ISMS specification - The final step of our method concerns the ISO 27001 specifi-
cation, an implementable description of the ISMS. We consider the ISO 27001 documentation demands
and use the information elicited and documented in the previous steps of our method. This information is
mapped to the required document types. These documents are also the basis for a certification of an ISO
27001 compliant ISMS.
The ISO 27001 standard has demands for quality requirements beyond security, namely compliance and
privacy. We provide support for eliciting and analyzing these requirements as part of our approach. We
show how compliance and privacy concerns are addressed in Fig. 2.3. The consideration of compliance
issues for cloud computing systems is also a key recommendation of Gartner’s [14] analysis.
In our PACTS method compliance identifies relevant laws and regulation and defines corresponding
requirements. The relation between compliance and privacy is that the compliance part identifies relevant
laws that concern privacy. The privacy part of our method uses these laws as input.
Step 8: Identify relevant Laws and Regulations - We use the information from the asset identification.
Namely we identify relevant laws and regulations with this information. This activity also has to identify
assets in terms of laws and regulations, which can be related to assets in terms of security. Moreover,
laws and regulations can regulate privacy concerns. This information is used during the instantiate privacy
patterns step of our method.
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Step 9: Define Compliance Controls - Once laws and regulations are identified, they have to be trans-
lated into ISO 27001 compliance controls. This translation is difficult, because in some cases laws or
regulations demand reasoning about a specific concern or they demand a specific functionality. In ad-
dition, compliance controls can have relations to other ISO 27001 controls. For example, a law could
demand a specific control in a certain situation, while the risk assessment results would not.
The ISO 27001 standard demands also the consideration of privacy in the informative ANNEX B. We
propose the following steps to address this concern.
Step 10: Instantiate Privacy Patterns - We use textual privacy patterns based upon the ISMS scope
definition and relevant laws and regulations. These patterns can be instantiated and they give rise to initial
privacy requirements. In addition, the identified assets for security can be considered, because if these
contain personal information they can also support instantiating further privacy patterns.
Step 11: Analyze Privacy Threats - We use a privacy threat analysis based on information flow be-
tween requirements. We analyze the flow of personal information based on the previously instantiated
privacy patterns and functional requirements of the cloud scenario. We also refine the initial privacy re-
quirements. The information flow among the requirements shows, which stakeholders have potentially
access to which personal information. Afterwards, software engineers have to check if the requirements
have to be modified in order to be privacy preserving.
2.4 Conclusions
The decision whether a cloud service is chosen by a costumer relies, amongst other reasons, on how
trustworthy the cloud system is. One way to establish this trust is to demonstrate that security, privacy,
and compliance are taken seriously by the cloud provider. This is usually achieved by providing certified
services. A well-known standard for such a certification is the ISO 27001 standard. However, establishing
an ISMS as required by this standard is a non-trivial task. Furthermore, the standard does not yet take the
special needs of cloud computing into consideration. With the work presented in this chapter we intend
to close the aforementioned gap. We do so by providing a structured pattern-based method to establish
an Information Security Management System (ISMS) according to the ISO 27001 standard. It has been
tailored to suit the demands for the cloud computing domain. We introduce specific patterns for clouds to
elicit the context of the envisioned ISMS. The approach further allows to refine the initially elicited context
with behavior descriptions. It also provides the means for documenting management commitment, threat
and risk analysis, as well as a pattern-based definition of security policies compliant to the ISO 27001
standard. We enhance the approach by providing validation conditions that can be used to check the
instantiated context as well as policy patterns. It is, for example, possible to check whether a given
responsible stakeholder in the policy pattern is also present in the context pattern. Moreover, we take the
standard’s demand to consider legal compliance and privacy into account.
In summary, the benefits of our approach are:
• A structured method for establishing a cloud-specific ISMS compliant to ISO 27001;
• Detailed steps for asset identification, threat analysis, risk management and security reasoning;
• The pattern-based method provides the means for consistency checks e.g. for the instantiation of
the pattern;
• Consideration of legal compliance via steps for identifying laws and regulations;
• Support for formulating and validating privacy requirements and conducting a privacy threat analysis;
• A systematic support to generate the required ISMS documentation in compliance to the standard;
• Integration of proven existing methods e.g. CORAS and Misuse Cases;
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• Integrating requirements engineering for security, legal compliance, and privacy to construct a holis-
tic ISMS.
In the future, we plan to provide a UML model for the cloud and policy patterns and implement the
consistency checks using the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [43]. We currently work on providing
tool-support for generating documents from our instantiated patterns in accordance with the ISO 27001
standard.
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3 Compositional verification of secure software ar-
chitectures
Purpose of the prototype verification of security properties on architecture models
Modeling formalism logic and architecture description language
Security concern secure architecture invariants
Partner(s) KUL
This chapter summarizes the work presented in [16]. Formal modeling is becoming a mainstream
research field in software engineering and is permeating all facets of software development. Promising
work has been carried out to apply formal methods to early models such as requirement models [45] and
secure design [26]. The benefits of formal techniques are apparent: a formal model is the scaffolding for
the precise reasoning about system qualities. However, formal methods are often criticized because of
two concerns: their steep learning curve, and their limited ability to scale up to realistically sized systems.
We introduce a formal modeling technique for secure software architectures [17]. That work leverages
model finding and the Alloy formal modeling language [22] as a means to verify that the security critical
parts of a software architecture adhere to their intended requirements. Additionally, the technique em-
braces the idea of iterative refinement, where the verification process carries on continuously from the
early, possibly partial model of the architecture down to the finished architectural design. The approach
tackles the first concern (usability) by showing that it is possible to package catalogs of reusable formal
models for commonly used design building blocks—specifically, security patterns [18], as patterns are
commonly used as means of refinement in architectural models. That allows architects to transparently
build more complex formal models by selecting and composing the elementary models from catalogs.
However, the resulting models (which we call ‘monolithic’) easily grow beyond the size that can be
handled by state-of-the-art verification tools, including the Alloy analyzer 1. Furthermore, the level of
detail of the uncovered weaknesses (i.e., the quality of the analysis) is directly proportional to the level of
detail with which the architecture is modelled. In general, these tools do not manage to efficiently verify
models with sufficient level of detail.
In practice, this problem is solved by simplification via abstraction, in which fine-grained implementation
details are omitted. This allows compositional security properties to be verified on an abstract composition,
and detailed verification of individual components on separate, refined component models. However, care
must be taken to ensure that the decomposition is correct. This largely boils down to two specific problems:
First, as abstractions are necessarily simpler than refinements, we need to be certain that compositional
properties still hold when we swap out an abstraction for its refinement. Second, we require guarantees
that a refinement does not exhibit behaviour that would introduce conflicts on a compositional level.
Our key contribution is a theoretical result that can be leveraged to overcome these scalability issues.
That result (in the form of three theorems) provides the necessary guidance on how to decompose an
architectural model into parts in a way that (1) properties on these parts can be independently verified,
(2) the parts can be replaced with more abstract representations, and hence (3) overall properties on the
complete model (which we call ‘modular’) can be verified at a fraction of the computational cost that would
be necessary for the monolithic model. Additionally, a much deeper level of analysis can be achieved,
meaning that more sophisticated issues can be uncovered. Finally, we provide a road map that shows
how to use tools such as the Alloy Analyzer to actually implement the proposed theoretical framework.
3.1 Summary of the approach
In order to make an abstraction from a part of a large detailed model description, the principle of informa-
tion hiding and encapsulation is used. Essentially, a component can be represented at different levels of
abstraction. A high level of abstraction (i.e., an abstract model description) allows the modeller to reason
efficiently about properties on the composition level, incorporating the abstract component in a model of
a larger system, and verifying what guarantees the component needs to fulfil in order for that composition
1http://alloy.mit.edu/alloy/
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to be secure. On the other hand, a low level of abstraction (i.e., a refined model description) allows the
modeller to model and verify the inner workings of that component up to an arbitrary level of detail. The
abstract component can be refined to a more detailed component specification, or even decomposed in
a proper sub-architecture, until the modeller is satisfied that the detailed model description is both secure
and implementable.
Ideally, when the abstract and refined component descriptions share the same public interface, i.e., the
operations that are relevant to the composition, we want to be able to transparently replace the refinement
with an abstraction in that composition and obtain the same results. As security properties of interest
we consider security requirements, which are operationalized security goals that are assigned to specific
actors. In our work, a security requirement is a temporal logic formula expressed over the interface of
a component. By requiring that abstract and refined components share that same interface, security
requirements are equally applicable to both. This allows us far more flexibility in modeling and verifying
software architectures, as shown in Figure 3.1: Instead of simply verifying one monolithic model, we can
split up a large model by isolating individual components. Every component can be verified in isolation
and subsequently refined to analyze local properties, and collected in reusable libraries of already verified
model parts, while global properties are verified on an abstract composition.
48 Thomas Heyman et al.
6 Model decomposition in practise
The theory from the previous section is now applied to the architecture
presented in Figure 2, which proved to be di cult to verify given current
model finding techniques. We show that the decomposition approach from
Section 5.3 allows us to verify the architecture for a larger scope, with a
much lower performance penalty.
In order to achieve this, the architecture is decomposed in three parts:
the Logger part, the AuditInterceptor part, and the Service part (which
includes the Author zationEnforcer). The choic of how to decompos is
based around standard software design principles (such as low coupling,
high cohesion, and reusability of the individual model descriptions), and is
independent of he proposed verificatio approach. In this section, we bas
our decomposition strategy on the security patterns present in the solu-
tion, i.e., the Secure Logger, Audit Interceptor and Authorization Enforcer
patterns [48]. We do this as secur ty patterns are r adily reusable, highly
cohesive, and their coupling to the rest of the system is su ciently low (so
they can easily be isolated).
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Fig. 7 An overview of the verification process for both the monolithic approach
and the modular approach. Rectangles denote artefacts, rounded blocks denote
modelling activities, arrows denote the normal progression of the verification pro-
cess.
Figure 3.1: c mparison of the monolithic ver us the modular ver fication approach.
Our modular verification technique is founded on the following practices. We have created a simple
architectural meta model that is still sufficiently expressive to model software architectures by taking into
account information from logical, physical and scenario views. The metamodel is shown in Figure 3.2. We
have encoded that metamodel in the Alloy formal modeling language. This facilitates creating formal Alloy
models of software architectures, as the metamodel connects informal software architecture descriptions
(expressed, for instance, in UML) to our formal specification. More details of the modeling and verification
technique can be found in [17].
As an illustration, consider an example software architecture as shown in Figure 3.3: A company has
deployed a service, and needs to audit all invocations made to that service. To achieve this, the software
architect introduces an interception facility (called the Audit System) to intercept all service invocations
and generate audit events which are written to a log. The logging functionality is implemented by a
Logger component. Furthermore, as we only want authorized users to access the service, the service
contains authorization functionality, realized by the Authorization Enforcer component. We are interested
to verify the requirement that for every execution of the operation ‘ProcessRequest’ on the ‘ServiceIF’
interface, the request is authorized and a corresponding audit event is stored by the audit system. This
requirement is readily encoded as a temporal logic predicate over the public interface of the system as
the Service component offers the ProcessRequest operation, the AuthorizationEnforcer allows to check
whether an invocation of that operation is authorized, and the AuditSystem exposes an operation to read
back the audit log. The security requirement then becomes that for all calling components, services and
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Figure 3.2: Our architectural metamodel (using UML syntax).
requests: it is always so that if the ProcessRequest operation is executed on that request, then the calling
component is authorized to access that service and there exists an AuditInterceptor so that in the future
that request can always be read back from that AuditInterceptor.
Verifying that requirement on a naive, monolithic Alloy model does not scale well, as can be seen in
the monolithic overhead data in Figure 3.4. For larger scopes (i.e., a more in-depth analysis, over models
that contain more elements), the verification easily takes hours. On the other hand, if we decompose
the monolithic Alloy model into an abstract composition containing an abstract Service and AuditSystem,
which are in turn refined into separate models containing a detailed AuthorizationEnforcer, resp. AuditIn-
terceptor and Logger, we can verify compositional properties such as the example security requirement
in a fraction of the cost, as indicated by the composition data in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.3: Logical view on an example architecture, providing access control and auditing func-
tionality.
We decompose this monolithic model by isolating parts of the architecture (i.e., one or more compo-
nents) that are replaced by one abstract component. We then verify that the abstraction and original,
refined part are behaviorally equivalent. This entails that the pre- and postconditions of the operations
that are shared by the abstraction and refinement are logically equivalent. This verification is facilitated
by the creation of a so-called glue model. Not only does this glue model allow us to verify behavioral
equivalence with the Alloy Analyzer, it also supports introducing systematic simplifications in the form of
correspondence assumptions. These assumptions allow the software architect to hide internal implemen-
tation details while maintaining full traceability of the exact simplifications under which the abstraction
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and refinement would not behave equivalently. It is then up to the software architect to accept these
correspondence assumptions, or fine-tune either the abstraction or refinement.
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Figure 3.4: Verification performance of the composition in function of the scope, for both the
modular and monolithic model descriptions
Finally, we leverage first order logic and model theory to prove that a (refined) part of a software
architecture can be replaced with a behaviorally equivalent abstraction. This entails the following two
things. First, if a property is shown to hold on the abstract composition, then it equally holds over the
original refined composition. Second, if the abstract composition still has instances (i.e., it does not
introduce conflicts), then the original refined composition also has instances.
3.2 Results
Verifying global properties on an abstract composition is an order of magnitude faster than verifying the
same property on the original refined composition, as shown in Figure 3.4. Additionally, the refined parts
can now iteratively be refined down to an arbitrary level of detail, and be decomposed in turn when they
too become too unwieldy. The modular approach is compared to the monolithic approach in Figure 3.1.
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the modular approach allows us to create reusable libraries
of already verified models, such as security patterns [18]. This allows the software architect to efficiently
create compositions of these other models, which can be independently verified to uphold certain prop-
erties (e.g., fine-grained security requirements) by experts. Finally, modular verification brings our formal
modeling and verification process closer to industrial practice, as they remove the technical limitations of
automated formal verification to scale up to realistically sized systems, and significantly help in reducing
the learning curve to create architectural compositions that contain sufficient detail to generate non-trivial
results.
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4 A UML extension for modeling protection-specific
security features for web applications
Purpose of the prototype Specify RBAC and protection-specific behavior in web application models
Modeling formalism UWE Models
Security concern RBAC, navigational access control and web-related security features
Partner(s) LMU
To secure web applications is increasingly important because of rising cybercrime as well as the grow-
ing awareness of data privacy. Besides confidential connections and authentication, both data access
control and navigational access control are the most relevant security features in this field. However,
adding such security features to already implemented web applications is an error-prone task. Therefore,
the goal is to include security features in early stages of the development process, i.e., at requirements
specification and design modeling level.
Existing approaches, such as OOHRIA [29], OOWS [44], WebML [30], UWE [27, 6], or ActionGUI [2]
already provide well-known methods and tools for the design of web applications. Most of them follow the
principle of “separation of concerns” using separate models for different views on the application, such
as e.g. content, navigation, presentation and business processes. Most of the available methods do not
support modeling security-features, whereas the UWE approach by Koch et al. [6] and the ActionGUI
approach by Basin et al. [2] define models for security features as access control and authorization.
ActionGUI’s proprietary notation comprises data models, security models and GUI models, and the appli-
cation logic is represented using OCL. UWE provides a set of UML stereotypes for each view, defined by
a so-called UML profile. UWE’s main focus is on the process of discussing and planning an application
from different points of view as e.g. requirements, content (data model), navigation, users and roles, basic
access control rights, presentation and process.
ActionGUI and UWE have been developed for many years, trying to abstract from as many implemen-
tational details as possible. What seems to be the right way for most modeling methods, raises questions
when dealing with secure web applications: How should Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF1) be pre-
vented? What should happen in case the web application is under attack, e.g., under denial-of-service
(DoS2) attack? So far, those questions tend to be answered in lengthy specification documents or they
are just documented by the code itself. Neither approach contribute to a quick understanding of the way
how web-related security concerns are managed for a certain web application.
Our approach is to address the answer to those questions at design level extending the set of model-
ing elements provided by UWE in order to be able to express protection-specific security concerns. This
means we extend UWE’s UML profile to support modeling the solutions deployed to shield a web applica-
tion and its users against attacks. Therefore, we find means to express security-related solutions for the
web, even though we maintain the necessary abstraction a modeling language needs.
In the following, we outline UML-based Web Engineering (UWE) [6], the security-aware engineering
approach we have chosen for modeling web applications. Afterwards, we describe our extension for
solution-specific security features, which is work in progress.
4.1 UML-based web engineering – UWE
One of the cornerstones of the UWE language is the “separation of concerns” principle using separate
models for different views. However, we can observe that security features are cross-cutting concerns
which cannot be separated completely. The main UWE models are:
The Requirements Model defines (security) requirements for a project.
1CSRF exploits the trust that a web site has in a user’s browser (and its cookies) when a user is logged in. For example, the user
clicks on an URL in an email and the site executes an action which was encoded in the URL, as signed in user.
2A DoS attack is characterized by a huge number of parallel requests, which are initiated by attackers, so that legitimate requests
cannot be answered any more.
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The Content Model contains the data structure used by the application.
The UWE Role Model describes a hierarchy of user groups to be used for authorization and access
control issues. It is usually part of a User Model, which specifies basic structures, as e.g., that a
user can take on certain roles simultaneously.
The Basic Rights Model describes access control policies. It constrains elements from the Content
Model and from the Role Model.
The Presentation Model sketches the web application’s user interface.
The Navigation State Model defines the navigation flow of the application and navigational access con-
trol policies. The former shows which possibilities of navigation exist in a certain context. The latter
specifies which roles are allowed to navigate to a specific state and the action taken in case access
cannot be granted. In a web application such actions can be, e.g., to logout the user and to redirect
to the login form or just to display an error message. Furthermore, secure connections are modeled.
For each view, an appropriate type of UML diagram is used, e.g., a state machine for the Navigational
Model. In addition, the UWE Profile adds a set of stereotypes, tag definitions and constraints, which can
be downloaded from the UWE website [28]. Stereotypes can then be applied to UML model elements and
values can be assigned to tags, which are associated to at least one stereotype.
4.2 Modeling protection-specific security features with UWE
To model protection-specific features with UWE, we extend the UWE Profile and add stereotypes and
tags. For example, UWE’s navigation state model can be enriched for modeling application behavior in
case of panic- or under-fire mode.
The PANIC MODE is useful for tumultuous regions around the world, where users might be physically
forced to sign in an online service. Thereby, the offender tries to get access to critical data, as e.g.,
communication in social networks or to force actions, as misinformation or money transfers. Figure 4.1
depicts how the panic mode can be modeled with UWE. Exemplarily, we extend an address book example
which was described in deliverable D7.1. UWE specifies that pwd.type can be used in guards, so that
another data set (i.e. account) is loaded, in case the user logs in with a predefined password that is
associated with the panic mode. It is important that the alternative account provides reasonable but
uncritical fake data, e.g., addresses the offender already knows.
Figure 4.1: UWE extension: panic mode (example extended from D7.1)
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Figure 4.1 also shows how the under-fire mode is used on the internal area for visitors. Therefore,
we added the tag {noAccessInModes} to the stereotype «navigationState» which is an ancestor of the
«session» stereotype. Values for the tag can be: critical denoting the under-fire mode, or maintenance
to express that this functionality should not be available when server software is updated. Further values
can be added individually so that, e.g., different kinds of attacks can be denoted.
Additionally, not only navigation states can be protected, but also data elements, as database entries.
This is done similarly by adding a {noAccessInModes} tag to the CRUD (create, read, update, delete)
access control dependencies of the Basic Rights Model. More information about the UWE models can be
found at [28].
Furthermore, we add protection-specific stereotypes to UWE’s context model which classify the kind
of CSRF prevention that is used. Additional stereotypes specify the chosen input validation mechanism,
which makes sure that user input cannot lead to attacks, as e.g., cross-site scripting (XSS)3.
Future work includes taking further web security features into account and to validate them by applying
them to modeling examples. We already started to model the customer web interface from the smart grid
case study of deliverable D11.3. We plan to present the models for the case study in D11.4.
3XSS is a form of injection, “in which malicious scripts are injected into the otherwise benign and trusted web sites” (https:
//owasp.org/index.php/XSS). Injected scripts can be stored on a server and distributed to other users, or just be reflected to the
local user, e.g., after submitting a script within an unprotected search form.
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5 ActionGUI toolkit and applications
Purpose of the prototype Model-driven development of secure data-managament applications
Modeling formalism DSLs for data, security, and GUI models
Security concern Fine-grained access control
Partner(s) IMDEA, ETH
ActionGUI is a novel model-driven methodology for developing secure data-management applications.
System developers proceed by modeling three different views of the desired application: its data model,
security model, and GUI model. These models formalize respectively the application’s data domain, au-
thorization policy, and its graphical interface together with its behavior. Afterwards a model-transformation
function automatically lifts the policy specified by the security model to the GUI model; this allows a sep-
aration of concerns where behavior and security are specified separately, and afterwards combined to
generate a security-aware GUI model. Finally, a code generator automatically generates a multi-tier ap-
plication, along with all support for access control, from the security-aware GUI model. Here we report on
applications that demonstrate the usefulness of our approach and the associated ActionGUI Toolkit.
5.1 ActionGUI Toolkit
The ActionGUI Toolkit (http://www.actiongui.org) features model editors for constructing and manipu-
lating data, security, and GUI models. Moreover, it implements our model transformation to automatically
generate security-aware GUI models. Finally, it includes a code generator that, given a security-aware
GUI model, automatically produces a web application, ready to be deployed, based on the following,
standard three-tier architecture.
• Presentation tier (or front-end): Users access web applications through standard web browsers,
which render the content (HTML and JavaScript) dynamically provided by the application server;
• Application tier: The toolkit generates Java Web Applications, implemented using the Vaadin
framework. The applications run in a servlet container (such as Tomcat or GlassFish), process
client’s requests and, generate content, which is sent back to the client for rendering. They may also
manipulate data stored in the data tier. When processing client requests, the generated application
interprets its underlying security-aware GUI model;
• Data tier (or back-end): The generated application manages information stored in database servers.
For each application, the toolkit generates the corresponding database schema from the applica-
tion’s data model.
Custom code Web applications may contain custom code for performing specific tasks such as printing
files, sending messages, or exporting data in various formats. Within the ActionGUI Toolkit, custom code
is declared using methods in the application’s data model. The application’s security model can be used
to declare access control policies for executing these methods, and the GUI model can declare events that
will trigger their execution. As expected, the ActionGUI Toolkit does not generate code for these methods.
Instead, it includes their implementation in the generated application and when the application needs to
interpret one of these methods, it simply calls the provided method.
5.2 Applications
To provide evidence of the usefulness of our approach, we report here on four web applications that we
developed using ActionGUI.
• Customer Relationship Management (CRMApp) We have developed a web application for man-
aging customers of a Hospital and Care Center. This application allows marketing and public rela-
tions personnel to manage contact information, including filtering contacts based on different criteria
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and exporting the results in Excel files. As customer data is highly sensitive, data access is sub-
ject to a restrictive access-control policy. For example, a marketing and PR staff member can only
access the contact information of those contacts previously selected as targets of a marketing cam-
paign to which he is assigned. The application also allows a General Manager to create marketing
campaigns, select the targeted patients, and assign to the campaigns marketing and PR staff mem-
bers;
• Volunteer Management (VMApp) We have also developed a web application for managing a Care
Center’s Volunteer Program. Using this application, the program’s coordinators can take actions
such as: introduce new volunteers; create, edit, and modify tasks; and propose these tasks to the
volunteers, based on the volunteers’ time availability and preferences. The access-control policy
stipulates, for example, that volunteers are only authorized to edit their own personal information,
such as their preferences and time availability, and to accept or reject their own tasks;
• Meal Service Management (MSMApp) This is a web application for managing a student resi-
dence’s meal service. Using this application, a resident can notify the administration whether he
will have a meal at the residence’s cafeteria, in which of the available time slots, and if he will bring
a guest. A resident shall only edit his own meal selection and within a specific time window, which
depends on the selected meal. Members of the administration can create new resident accounts,
and automatically list the requested meals for each available time slot;
• EHealth Record Management (eHRMApp) This is a web application for managing eHealth records.
It allows users with the appropriate roles to do the following: register new patients in a hospital and
assign to them clinicians (doctor, nurses, etc.); retrieve patient information; register new nurses and
doctors in a hospital and assign them to a ward; change nurses or doctors from one ward to another;
and move patients to a different practice. The access-control policy regulates, in particular, access
to the patients’ highly sensitive records. These records shall only be retrieved by their handling
doctors, although this policy can be relaxed in an emergency situation.
CRMApp, VMApp, and MSMApp are commercial applications. They were developed for real cus-
tomers, and they are currently being used by their different stakeholders. In contrast, EHRMApp was
developed as a case study proposed by our industrial partners in NESSoS.
We conclude this section with several considerations. As these are just based on our experience, their
significance should not be overemphasized. Nevertheless they can give an impression of what it is like to
use ActionGUI.
First, the learning curve for ActionGUI appears moderate. The time required to learn to model a secure
data-management application depends on the modeler’s familiarity with class diagrams, security diagrams
and, above all, OCL. Assuming modest knowledge of UML, learning to model (non-toy) applications using
ActionGUI takes less than 4 hours, which is arguably much less than what is required to learn enough of
web technologies to be able to program (and correctly deploy) these applications. This estimate is based
in part on experience teaching model-driven development of secure data-management applications to
students at ETH Zurich and having them carry out projects using ActionGUI.
Second, the time needed to model a secure data-management application depends on the experience
of the modeler (in particular, his command of OCL) and the complexity of the application (in particular, the
number and the size of the OCL expressions used in the model). However, as a rule of thumb, modeling
a menu window that contains 6 buttons that, when clicked upon, will open other windows, may take less
than 30 minutes. In contrast, modeling a window that contains an online form with 10 text fields and a
button that, when clicked upon, will first check that the entries are correctly filled and then will submit the
form (i.e., update the database), may take one to two hours. And approximately the same time is required
to model a select&display window that contains a table with 5 columns and a combo box, and that will
change the information displayed in the table depending on the combo box selection. The take-home
message is that modeling time is directly proportional to the number and size of the OCL expressions
used in the models. This should not come as a surprise since these expressions are the ones that define
the application’s logic.
Finally, the main advantages of our approach concern the quality and ease of maintenance of the gen-
erated applications, which results from using our many-models-to-models transformation and our code-
generator. First, this transformation effectively frees the developer from having to program fine-grained
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authorization constraints and insert them at all the required places within the application’s code and with
the correct arguments. Except for small applications, this is a cumbersome and error-prone task, since
the number of data actions associated to events may easily be on the order of several hundred. Moreover,
these data actions are typically called with different arguments each time. Second, our approach supports
modularity and separation of concerns. In particular, the security model can be changed independently of
the GUI model, without worrying about re-programming and re-inserting all the new fine-grained authoriza-
tion constraints since this is automatically done by our transformation. Again, given the large number of
these checks together with the complexity of the corresponding authorizations, we argue that, for non-toy
security data-management applications, our approach effectively reduces the maintenance costs.
5.3 Conclusions
Our ActionGUI methodology is supported by the ActionGUI Toolkit. Applications like those described here
show the toolkit’s potential for developing real-world applications. Nevertheless, there is still much work
ahead to turn this toolkit into a full, robust, industrial-strength development platform. In the short term,
we plan to develop improved model editors and better support for integrating custom code. In the long
term, we would like to support GUIs running on different platforms, like mobile devices. We also plan to
add support for handling privacy policies: modeling and generating code to enforce that data usage must
follow the purpose for which the data was collected and may entail obligations.
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6 Validation of ATL declarative transformations us-
ing transformation models and model finders
Purpose of the prototype Validating declarative ATL transformations
using transformation models and model finders
Modeling formalism MOF compliant metamodels, OCL, ATL
Security concern Preservation of security properties
captured as relations between model elements
or written as OCL pre- and postconditions
through model transformations
Partner(s) ATOS, INRIA
6.1 Background
In model-driven engineering, models constitute pivotal elements of the software to be built. If models
are specified well, transformations can be employed for different purposes, e.g., to produce final code.
However, it is important that models produced by a transformation from valid input models are valid, too,
where validity refers to the metamodel constraints, often written in OCL. Transformation models are a way
to describe this Hoare-style notion of partial correctness of model transformations using only metamodels
and constraints. In this chapter we report on an automatic translation of declarative, rule-based model
transformations implemented with the ATL language 1 into such transformation models, that provides an
intuitive and versatile encoding of ATL into OCL that can be used for the analysis of various properties
of transformations. We furthermore show how existing model satisfiability checkers for OCL-annotated
metamodels can be applied for the verification of the translated ATL transformations, providing evidence
for the effectiveness of our approach in practice.
6.2 Problem statement
For this deliverable the problem statement is the same as the one that we already reported for deliverable
D7.3. Let us recall our setting next. A developer who is designing a model transformation typically asks the
following question several times during the designing process: Do the constraints imposed on the source
model plus the transformation specification guarantee that the constraints imposed on the target model
hold? If the answer to this question is ‘yes’ for certain properties, we would say that the transformation
which is being designed is correct with respect to the given sets of pre and postconditions. Namely, in our
view, a model transformation is correct if and only if executing it using a constrained-valid input model as
argument always results on a constrained-valid output model, where a constrained-valid input model is a
model that satisfies the model transformation’s preconditions and a constrained-valid output model is a
model that satisfies the model transformation’s postconditions.
We present here an extension to the prototype that we introduced in D7.3. This extension is based
on a novel methodology that can be used to perform automatic, bounded verification of ATL [24] trans-
formations. ATL (ATL Transformation Language) is a model transformation language and toolkit (http:
//www.eclipse.org/atl/). This is a research result of the collaboration between ATOS and INRIA that
was published at the beginning of the third year of NESSoS [7]. This work is focused, as the work we
reported last year, on checking partial correctness of declarative, rule-based transformations between
metamodels with constraints. However, the solution we presnet here supplements the one presented in
D7.3. More specifically, we consider the ATL transformation language and MOF [38] style metamodels
that employ OCL constraints to precisely describe their domain. Nowadays, both formalisms count with
sophisticated tool support and OCL is employed in almost all OMG specifications.
1http://www.eclipse.org/atl/
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The increasingly popularity of MDE has led to a growing complexity in both models and transforma-
tions, and it is essential that transformations are correct if they are to play their key role. Otherwise, errors
introduced by transformations will be propagated and may produce more errors in the subsequent MDE
steps.
Model transformations can be considered as programs that operate on instances of metamodels. In
this sense, we can also apply the classical notion of correctness to model transformations. More specifi-
cally, we consider the transformation language ATL [24] and metamodels in MOF [38] style (e.g., EMF [41],
KM3 [25]) that employ OCL [37, 47] constraints to precisely describe their domain.
6.3 Approach
In this chapter we present a verification approach based on transformation models. Transformation models
are a specific kind of what is commonly called a ‘trace model’. Given an ATL transformation T :MI !MF
from a source metamodelMI to a target metamodelMF , a transformation modelMT is a metamodel
that includesMI andMF , and additional structural modeling elements and constraints in order to capture
the execution semantics of T .
Our notion of a transformation modelMT of a transformation T : MI ! MF 2 aims to support the
verification of partial correctness of T usingMT as an equivalent surrogate. A pair of anMI instance
MI and anMF instance MF is related by T if and only if there is an instance ofMT , valid w.r.t. to all
constraints, whoseMI part isMI and whoseMF part isMF . 3
Having translated an ATL transformation T into a purely structural transformation model MT (i.e.,
a metamodel consisting of classes and their properties, and constraints), we can employ ‘off-the-shelf’
model finders (model satisfiability checkers) to verify partial correctness of T w.r.t. the metamodel con-
straints ofMF usingMT .
In particular, we can check whether T might turn a valid input model MI into an invalid output model
MF as follows: Let coni with 1  i  n denote the i-th constraints ofMF . LetMF i denote a modified
version ofMF stripped of all its constraints and having one new constraint negconi that is the negation of
coni. LetMT i denote the transformation model constructed for T :MI !MF i. T is correct w.r.t. coni
if and only ifMT i has no instance. If such an instance exist, itsMI is a counter example for which T
produces an invalid result.
In our opinion, this approach brings advantage because it reduces the problem of verifying rule-based
transformations between constrained metamodels to the problem of verifying constrained metamodels
only. This way, in terms of automated verification, we can reuse existing implementations and work for
model verification, benefiting from the results achieved by a broad community over a decade.
Below, we present an extension to the ATL2FOL prototype, called ATL2Alloy, that is able to automat-
ically generate transformation models from declarative ATL transformations. Furthermore, it uses model
finders that can be employed ‘off-the-shelf’ in practical verification for the so obtained OCL-annotated
metamodels.
6.4 Prototype
In the field of MDE, ATL provides ways to produce a set of target models from a set of source models.
Developed on top of the Eclipse platform, the ATL Integrated Environnement (IDE) provides a number of
standard development tools (syntax highlighting, debugger, etc.) which aim to ease development of ATL
transformations. The architecture of our ATL2Alloy prototype shares this toolkit with ATL2FOL as a front-
end since it eases the use for the developer and because of the standard development tools that allow
also the parsing and type checking of ATL transformations and OCL constraints. Thus, taking as input
an ATL specification, i.e., a source and a target metamodel and an ATL transformation defined between
them, our ATL2Alloy prototype’s components depicted in Fig. 6.1 work as we describe next:
• The ATL transformation engine is the component where the user can specify a model-to-model ATL
transformation;
2For typographical reasons we useMI (‘initial’) andMF (‘final’) to denote the input and output.
3In practice, we want to loosen this equivalence to hold only for thoseMI for which T terminates.
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Figure 6.1: Prototype architecture
• The ATL2M component consists of a so-called ‘higher-order’ ATL transformation, that is, an ATL
transformation that takes an ATL transformation (the one to be verified, including the input and
output metamodels) that produces the corresponding transformation model following the algorithm
that is specified in [7]. The metamodels and constraints are technically represented using EMF and
OCLinEcore. The result of this transformation is then fed to the UML2Alloy model finder [1] to check
the ‘negated’ transformation model (as explained above) for satisfiability;
• UML2Alloy translates the metamodel and the OCL constraints into a specification for the Alloy tool,
which implements bounded verification of relational logic. In the resulting specification, each class is
represented as an Alloy signature each OCL constraint is represented by exactly one Alloy fact with
the same name as the OCL constraint. Thus, we can check for the constraint subsumption easily by
disabling and negating the facts (one after another) for theMF constraints.
Notice the benefits of the counterexamples that our method produces: The counterexamples represent at
the same time the offending input model (that reveals the problem) and an explanation of the transforma-
tion execution (how the rules turn the input model into an invalid output model). In our view, this makes
our method an intuitive and powerful tool for transformation developers.
While working with our prototype we got some insights into the scalability of the verification method that
we would like to briefly mention here. Depending on the constraint, the verification time starts to become
significant above 100 objects. We could confirm that larger class diagrams / larger instance sets do not
necessarily increase the solving times, whereas harder (more overlapping, less tractable) constraints do.
In this sense, we are confident that our method is applicable to at least medium size metamodels as well.
However, for the verification of industrial size metamodels and transformations, we expect that further
heuristics and separation of concerns strategies will be required (e.g., metamodel pruning [40]).
Example
Metamodels. Let us explain how ATL2Alloy works using an example similar to the one used to explain
ATL2FOL in D7.3. We think that this will help us to show how ATL2Alloy supplements the ATL2FOL
prototype.
Figure 6.2 depicts the ER and REL metamodels that are the source and target metamodels for the
ER2REL transformation, which is depicted in Fig. 6.3. Next, we will recall these metamodels and the
meaning of the ATL transformation that we use as example. In the ER metamodel, a schema may have
entities and relationships (relships), both may contain attributes, and attributes may be keys; in the REL
metamodel, a schema may have relations, which may have again attributes.4 We only provide here
4For simplicity, we refer to the metamodel elements as schemas, entities, relationships, etc., instead of using schema type, entity
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Figure 6.2: ER and REL metamodels
module ER2REL; create OUT : REL from IN : ER;
rule S2S { from s : ER!ERSchema to t : REL!RELSchema (name <- s.name) }
rule E2R { from s : ER!Entity
to t : REL!Relation (name <-s.name , schema <-s.schema) }
rule R2R { from s : ER!Relship
to t : REL!Relation (name <-s.name , schema <-s.schema) }
rule EA2A { from att : ER!ERAttribute , ent : ER!Entity (att.entity=ent)
to t : REL!RELAttribute
(name <-att.name , isKey <-att.isKey , relation <-ent ) }
rule RA2A { from att : ER!ERAttribute , rs : ER!Relship (att.relship=rs)
to t : REL!RELAttribute
(name <-att.name , isKey <-att.isKey , relation <-rs) }
rule RA2AK { from att : ER!ERAttribute , rse : ER!RelshipEnd
(att.entity=rse.entity and att.isKey=true)
to t : REL!RELAttribute
(name <-att.name , isKey <-att.isKey , relation <-rse.relship)}
Figure 6.3: The ATL transformation ER2REL
an informal description of ER2REL. In a nutshell, the ER2REL transformation takes an instance of the ER
metamodel as input and produces an instance of the REL metamodel following the transformation in Fig.
6.3. This transformation is described by matched rules, which are the workhorse of ATL. Matched rules
define a pattern of input types and possibly a filter expression (the from-clause). Each rule is applied
to each matching set of objects in the input model to create the objects in the target model that are
described in the to-clause, assigning values to their properties (typically) based on the input objects’
properties. The first rule in Fig. 6.3, S2S, maps ER schemas to REL schemas, the second rule E2R maps
each entity to a relation, and the third rule R2R maps each relationship to a relation. The remaining
three rules generate attributes for the relations. Both, entity and relationship attributes are mapped to
relation attributes (rules EA2A and RA2A). Furthermore, the key attributes of the participating entities are
mapped to relation attributes as well (rule RA2AK). Notice that in the property assignment, a so-called
implicit resolution step is needed to resolve source objects to target objects: For example the binding
schema<-s.schema in E2R and R2R ‘silently’ replaces the ERschema value of s.schema by the RELSchema
object that is created for s.schema by S2S.
In Fig. 6.4, we provide a very simple extension to the ER and REL metamodels in order to illustrate
the application of our prototype to security concerns. In Fig. 6.4, the ER and the REL metamodels are
extended with two additional metaclasses, i.e., one to model roles and the other to model permissions for
a role-based access control policy that may be required on the ER and REL elements. Rol and permission
metaclasses are associated to each other and, also, permissions are associated to schemas indicating
that they regulate the access to these type of resources.
type, etc..
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Figure 6.4: RBAC extension for the metaclass schema
In this setting, we may wonder if the security policy imposed on ER schemas is adequately trans-
lated by the transformation ER2RELSec (depicted in Fig. 6.5) to schemas in the target REL metamodel.
For instance, let us take as a security precondition that every ERSchema can be accessed by the role
’Operator’. Is it the case that upon the execution of the transformation ER2RELSec it is true that every
RELSchema can be accessed also by a corresponding role ’Operator’?. Notice that the ER2RELSec
just contains two additional rules that extend the transformation ER2REL in order to map roles and per-
missions, its relations and assignments to resources. In our modeling language, the requirement that
operators are always granted access to ER schemas is modeled for each schema by the existence of
an instance of the metaclass Role named ’Operator’, an instance of the metaclass permission and a link
between this role and permission instances, and another link between such permission and any instance
of the class ERSchema.5 The OCL expression capturing this security precondition is:
inv secpre1:
ERSchema.allInstances ()->forall(x | ERRole.allInstances ()->exists(r | r.name =
'Operator ' and ERPermission.allInstances ()->exists(p | r.permission ->includes(p)
and p.resource ->includes(x))))
Similarly, the OCL expression capturing the intended security postcondition is:
inv secpost1:
RELSchema.allInstances ()->forall(x | RELRole.allInstances ()->exists(r | r.name =
'Operator ' and RELPermission.allInstances ()->exists(p |
r.relpermission ->includes(r) and p.relresource ->includes(x))))
Let us next formalize this problem according to our methodology. Let us consider the transforma-
tion ER2REL⇤ : ER ! REL⇤, where REL⇤ is the metamodel REL but having only the invariant
not(secpost1) as its constraint. Let thenMER2REL⇤ be a transformation model for ER2REL⇤. Then,
ER2REL⇤ is correct w.r.t. secpost1 if and only ifMER2REL⇤ has no instance. If such an instance exist,
its part in ER is a counter example for which ER2REL produces an invalid result.
Once the security pre and postcondition and the rules depicted in Figure 6.5 are mapped to Alloy using
our prototype that implements the transformation algorithm that we describe in [7], we can automatically
search for instances ofMER2REL⇤ . Naturally, while we are incrementing the number of objects allowed
to build such instance our confidence grows on our transformation to be correct since such instance is
not found by Alloy. However, we cannot derive a definitive conclusion since with this method we are only
performing bounded checkings. But, since we now really suspect our transformation to be correct, we
employ the part ATL2FOL of our prototype using as input the transformation ER2REL⇤. We find that Z3
returns ‘unsat’ showing that our transformation is definitely correct w.r.t. the secpre1 and secpost1 (the
5Notice that at this step, for simplicity reasons, we avoid talking about which type of access, i.e., which kind of actions (write,
read, etc.) can a role perform on schemas.
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module ER2RELSec;
create OUT : REL from IN : ER;
rule Rol2Rol {from r : ER!ERRole
to k : REL!RELRole (name <- r.name , permission <-r.permission)}
rule Perm2Perm {from p : ER!ERPermission
to q : REL!RELPermission (name <- p.name , resource <-p.resource)}
rule S2S { from s : ER!ERSchema to t : REL!RELSchema (name <- s.name) }
rule E2R { from s : ER!Entity
to t : REL!Relation (name <-s.name , schema <-s.schema) }
rule R2R { from s : ER!Relship
to t : REL!Relation (name <-s.name , schema <-s.schema) }
rule EA2A { from att : ER!ERAttribute , ent : ER!Entity (att.entity=ent)
to t : REL!RELAttribute
(name <-att.name , isKey <-att.isKey , relation <-ent ) }
rule RA2A { from att : ER!ERAttribute , rs : ER!Relship (att.relship=rs)
to t : REL!RELAttribute
(name <-att.name , isKey <-att.isKey , relation <-rs) }
rule RA2AK { from att : ER!ERAttribute , rse : ER!RelshipEnd
(att.entity=rse.entity and att.isKey=true)
to t : REL!RELAttribute
(name <-att.name , isKey <-att.isKey , relation <-rse.relship)}
Figure 6.5: Extension of ER2REL to map RBAC structures
interested reader can find details of how the example is processed by ATL2FOL in deliverable D7.3).
Consider now the same setting for our example keeping as precondition secpre1 while considering as
postcondition only secpost2:
inv secpost2:
RELSchema.allInstances ->forall(x| relrole.allinstances ->forall(r|r.name='Operator '
implies RELpermission.allInstances ->exists(p|r.relpermission ->includes(r) and
p.relresource ->includes(x))))
Following the same methodology as for the previous example, we feed to ATL2Alloy the transformation
that has as its final metamodel REL with the only constraint not(secpost2). For this example, ATL2Alloy
finds the instance depicted in Figure 6.6 that shows that the transformation ER2REL⇤ is not correct with
respect to secpre1 and secpost2 since it produces a bad instance of the final metamodel (i.e., an instance
that do not fulfil secpost2 from a good instance of the initial metamodel (i.e., an instance that does fulfil
secpre1).
We want to emphasize that the verification process can be automated as a “black box” technology,
in the sense that the transformation developer is in contact only with models, in which the generated
transformation models and their instances have a familiar representation for him. In Figure 6.7 we show
the prototypes described in D7.3 and this document shares the modeling interface so they allow the user
to perform for the same transformation both bounded and unbounded verification.
In the future, we plan to explore the capabilities of different model finders as backends to our approach,
in order to evaluate which are best suited for this kind of verification. Regarding ATL, we have already
implemented an important subset of ATL, but we will incorporate (a restricted form) of so called lazy rules,
which can be found in several transformations. Last but not least, comprehensive case studies must give
more feedback on the applicability of our work.
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Figure 6.6: Instance of the counter example found by Alloy
Figure 6.7: Architecture of the prototype supporting ATL verification
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7 Integrating intrusion detection in a models@runtime
framework
Purpose of the prototype Secure runtime reconfiguration
Modeling formalism Kevoree
Security concern Intrusion detection
Partner(s) INRIA
Future Internet systems such as cloud platforms or pervasive systems (e.g. sensor networks, peer-to-
peer applications on mobile personal devices, etc) are inherently dynamically adaptive in the sense that
they are able to change their architecture while they are deployed and running. Changes of architecture
occur mostly without human intervention, as a result of adaptation policies executed by the system itself
or by an external supervision system. Needs for adaptation come either from changes in the needs of
the dynamic system (for instance to support new services or implementations), or from changes in the
system’s environment (for instance to take into account changes in resource availability or cost, load
peaks, etc.). Adaptation can be organized using the MAPE (Monitor, Analyze, Plan, Execute) paradigm
[20].
Software design techniques such as Models@runtime [5] are a powerful way of building self-managing
systems, leveraging continuous design and eternal system management. Models@runtime relies on the
continuous management of architecture models [31] that abstract platform details and describe the current
architectures and candidates for architecture changes. Prior to a configuration change, the analyze part of
the MAPE loop builds a set of models describing potential new architectures of the system. This analysis
aims at checking that the planned system evolution stays within limits and constraints defined by the
human designer.
7.1 Security issues for dynamically adaptive systems
While all systems are targets for attacks, dynamic architectures bring in new security-related issues. Be-
cause of their dynamic nature, they offer many possible configurations, and hence increase the system’s
surface for attack. Because of their intrinsic mechanisms for the application of architecture changes, they
ease the task of attackers: a malicious architecture model could be propagated effortlessly and compro-
mise the whole system. Because of their autonomy and self-care principles, dynamic systems must detect
and counter attacks autonomously, without the help of a human security expert.
Dynamic architectures must therefore provide self-protection, including architecture-based self-protection
[48]. Security must be integrated in the MAPE loop, with appropriate means for attack detection, selection
of countermeasures and application of countermeasures using Models@runtime.
7.1.1 System structure and threat model
We have developed a dynamic component-based framework [10], which implements Models@runtime
for heterogeneous distributed execution platforms. Kevoree simplifies the designer’s work by offering
advanced dynamic model management and taking care of complex issues such as distributed commu-
nication, distributed data consistency and dynamic architecture deployment. To tackle security problems
such as the ones mentioned in the previous section, we are currently integrating a set of concepts and
implementations in our Kevoree framework to support security policies.
The main concepts in Kevoree are as follows.
• nodes: containers for execution of components and manager of the models at runtime implementa-
tion;
• channels: distributed communication entities that interconnects two components or more, and can
be 1-1, 1-N, N-N, with a variety of communication semantics (e.g. 1-1 sequential lossless, 1-N
causal broadcast, etc);
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• groups: distributed data consistency managers, with a variety of data consistency semantics.
The system boundary in terms of security is the set of components defined in the currently deployed
configuration. This system has the following subsystems:
• a set of local operating systems on each physical execution node (e.g. Arduino loader, Android,
Linux, etc), responsible for VM execution and network communication;
• a set of Kevoree nodes, responsible for Models@runtime implementation (keeping the architectural
model in bidirectional synchronization with the concrete execution platform);
• on each Kevoree node: a set of Kevoree components for application, a set of Kevoree channels and
a set of group stubs;
• there is at least one master node, which is used to bootstrap the deployment of the system, dissem-
inate architectural constraints when they change, and setup a distributed key infrastructure in the
system.
We are currently considering the following general types of threat: network attacks from outside the
system (i.e. not Kevoree specific), tampering with models during their propagation in the set of nodes,
and tampering with the distributed algorithm for analysis and planning. We focus especially on the last
two types, because they are specific to weaknesses of a models at runtime implementation of continuous
design.
The main security policy rules are that:
• policies must be enforced automatically, there will be no human being behind a console to react;
• architecture changes proposed by nodes are evaluated by the set of nodes and accepted or rejected
by a poll among the nodes;
• architectural changes proposed by a master node are accepted without poll if they are signed with
a proper key.
7.2 General approach for securing an adaptive environment
Our current approach to secure the Kevoree framework relies on an intrusion detection system to detect
suspicious entities in a distributed system. We are currently focusing on securing a cloud platform. We
selected cloud platforms since the elastic management of resources makes them very dynamic, but also
challenges most current solutions for intrusion detection and autonomous protection. Our solution (figure
7.1) relies on the following design principles:
• intrusion detection is done at a low communication level (OS level), by running a monitoring tool on
a subset of the nodes;
• communication and behavior patterns observed on a node are analyzed at the node level to detect
insider attacks (defense in depth);
• models are signed using a public distributed key infrastructure;
• automated reaction to intrusion by application of a strategy to counter the intrusion (Analyze, Plan);
• secure private polling to implement the automated reaction using a distributed analysis and decision
system among the components of the system.
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Figure 7.1: A secure architecture for adaptive FI system.
7.2.1 Intrusion detection
We use a gradual response mechanism to control the overhead associated with monitoring and counter-
measures application, aiming at a reasonable percentage of false positives. The first layer of monitoring
operates at a network frame level. In its cheapest configuration, a Snort-based monitor node observes all
local network traffic and therefore can detect attacks that occur on nodes on the same local network than
the monitor. In the general case, there will be at least a monitor node on each local network, up to one
monitor on each node. The set of monitors are connected through one or more secure Kevoree channels.
The Snort rule database is setup and updated by security experts, and disseminated in the architecture
using the secure Kevoree model dissemination mechanisms.
7.2.2 Model based countermeasures
Once a monitor detects a suspicious network activity, it starts an analysis phase. This phase produces
one or more new architecture models, which should counter the attack.
The construction of a new model (or a set of new models) uses model transformations described by
patterns. More precisely, when one intrusion detection rule matches then one or more new models are
produced from the existing architecture model by executing a sequence of elementary transformations.
These transformations are setup by a security and a design experts. These transformations need to
consider a trade-off between multiple objectives (ensure security in the system, keep a good quality for
the application, handle the load, etc.). We address this through automatic multi-objective search, using
genetic algorithms that explore the space of possible models that can address the threat while satisfying
requirements for quality and functionality. We leverage our recent work on for model synthesis [9] to
perform self-adaptation of countermeasure patterns.
7.2.3 Secure private polling
The newmodels are generated by the monitor that detected an intrusion. However, as the dissemination of
a new architecture has an impact on several nodes, the new model must be proposed to other monitors.
The other monitors must then vote to accept the new model or not. As the proposing monitor may be
compromised, and as the voters may also be compromised, we use a secure private polling distributed
algorithm. We are currently investigating the SPP algorithm by Gambs et al. [12] to perform this poll.
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The algorithm withstands up to n(1/2 - epsilon) compromised nodes. We are also investigating whether
the use of the Models@runtime paradigm can lead to a more efficient SPP variant, especially for a better
scalability.
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8 Trust-based runtime reconfiguration for self-adaptive
systems
Purpose of the prototype Building trust and reputation models in services and applications
Modeling formalism Java, Kevoree
Security concern Trust and reputation
Partner(s) UMA, INRIA
The Future Internet (FI) scenarios are bringing two important changes in the ICT world. On the one
hand, the uprising of the service-oriented vision enables the on-the-fly improvement of the features offered
to users. Applications become more dynamic and require rapid adaptations to meet new requirements or
respond to environmental changes. On the other hand, the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) is
bringing the seamless integration between the physical and the virtual worlds. As a consequence, both
services and systems as a whole must adapt to dynamic changes in hardware, firmware and software,
including the unpredictable arrival or disappearance of devices and software components.
The aforementioned reasons prevent system architects and designers to envision all possible situa-
tions an application will have to cope with, and the boundaries between design and runtime are blurring
[15]. This calls for new software engineering approaches that allow keeping an abstract representation
of a running system in order to reason about changes and drive dynamic reconfiguration, leading to the
so-called ’models@runtime’ paradigm [5].
Security is a crucial issue that must be addressed in order to guarantee the successful deployments
of FI scenarios [46]. Increasing security in FI applications entails that trust relationships between compo-
nents, applications and system environments cannot be taken for granted any more, and must be explicitly
declared, monitored and changed accordingly. In fact, we argue that the management of these trust rela-
tionships, together with the notion of reputation, can drive the reasoning process required in self-adaptive
systems.
The goal that we pursue is to provide developers with a development framework to build trust-aware
and self-adaptive applications. This way, self-adaptability can also be guided by the trust relationships
and entities’ reputation, increasing the security of the developed applications.
8.1 Kevoree
Models@runtime [5] refers to model-driven approaches that aim to tame the complexity of software and
system dynamic adaptation, pushing the idea of reflection one step further. Kevoree [10] is an open-
source dynamic component model that relies on models at runtime to properly support the design and
dynamic adaptation of distributed systems.
Seven concepts constitute the basis of the Kevoree component metamodel, as shown in Figure 8.1.
A node models a device on which software components can be deployed, whereas a group defines a
set of nodes that share the same representation of the reflecting architectural model. A port represents
an operation that a component provides or requires. A binding represents the communication between a
port and a channel, which in turn models the semantics of communication. The core library of Kevoree
implements these concepts for several platforms such as Java, Android or Arduino.
Kevoree follows the process shown in Figure 8.2 in order to implement models@runtime. When a new
model, namely a target model, is generated, this target model is checked and validated to ensure a well-
formed system configuration. Then it will be compared with the current model of the running system. This
comparison generates a so-called adaptation model that contains a set of abstract primitives required to
move from the current model to the target model. These primitives will be turned into concrete primitives
that the running platform can execute. Thus, the synchrony between the system model and the running
system is kept.
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Binding Provided port Required port
Node
Figure 8.1: Kevoree architectural elements
Figure 8.2: Adaptation
8.2 Approach
Up to now, the Kevoree platform does not support reasoning about qualitative or security-related concerns,
and therefore any architectural element such as a node or a software component can join the system
without further checks. Also, there are no criteria to guide the runtime changes. We aim at enriching
these architectural elements with trust and reputation capabilities in order to support decision-making for
reconfiguration.
The approach followed to achieve this is depicted in Figure 8.3, where a simple system with two
communicating nodes is represented. As we explained above, both nodes share a model that represents
the system (system metamodel). We add now a trust model that is also shared by both nodes. This
model is an instantiation of a trust metamodel that captures knowledge of trust and reputation models as
explained by Moyano et al. [36, 33, 34].
In order to provide developers with a framework to implement trust-aware self-adaptive systems, we
offer two APIs. The trust API allows instatiating the trust metamodel, creating a trust model among nodes
and components. For example, using this API the developer can specify which node acts as a trustor and
which as a trustee or the engine used to update the trust relationships.
On the other hand, the reconfiguration API allows developers to specify rules for changing the system
as a response to changes in trust. For example, developers could specify that when trust falls below a
certain threshold, the binding among the nodes or components is removed.
The code in Figure 8.4 shows how a developer can create a trustor component. The yellow box depicts
a dictionary, that is, a set of pairs key, value. These values can be changed at runtime, for instance, using
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Figure 8.3: Approach
the Kevoree editor or kevscript instructions. For a trustor, we define a name for the context under which
its trust relationships will take place, and the engine used to update its trust relationships.
Then, we specify that the trustor is a Kevoree component by annotating it with @ComponentType and
extending the AbstractComponentType abstract class. The method start is executed when a component
is first initialized. We specify then that any trustor component should first initialize its trust relationships.
@DictionaryType({!
        !@DictionaryAttribute(name = "trustContext" , defaultValue 
= "myContext",optional = false),!
!@DictionaryAttribute(name = "metric", defaultValue 
="MyTrustEngine", optional = false)!
}     )!
!
@ComponentType!
public class Trustor extends AbstractComponentType {!
!
!public void start() {!
! !…!
! !initializeTrustRelationships();!
!}!
}!
Change at Runtime!
Figure 8.4: Creating a trustor component
Figure 8.5 shows part of the implementation of initializeTrustRelationships. It basically retrieves all the
components flagged as trustees that share the same context as the trustor. Then, the method addTrustRe-
lationship will be in charge of interacting with the trust metamodel in order to instantiate it appropriately.
Up to now, we have described the implementation of the API that will be provided to developers. When
they want to use this API, they would simply need to create a component that extends from the trustor
component created in Figure 8.4. By implementing an interface for metric computation, the developer will
be able to specify the engine used to update the trustor’s trust relationships.
Reconfiguration rules can then be written by developers in order to specify changes at runtime as a
response to changes in trust. For this purpose, developers can use Kevscript, a script language provided
by Kevoree that allows changing a system at runtime, as shown in Figure 8.6.
More details about this work are provided in a paper published in the Trust Managament’13 conference
proceedings [32].
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HashMap<String, List<String>> trustees = 
GetHelper.getTrusteeInstanceName(getModelServ
ice().getLastModel(), context, trusteeType);!
…!
!
!
!
        //idTrustee is a list of trustees!
        for (int i = 0; i < idTrustee.size(); i++) {!
            addTrustRelationship(m, context,   !
                                  idTrustor, idTrustee.get(i));!
        }!
Access to Kevoree Metamodel!
Figure 8.5: Initializing trust relationships
IF TRUSTOR.TRUST(TRUSTEE) < THRESHOLD!
      THEN  {!
//KEVSCRIPT INSTRUCTIONS!
 addNode node1 : JavaSENode!
 addNode node2 : JavaSENode !
 addChannel  mysockChannel : SocketChannel {  }!
 bind fake1.textEntered@node1 => mysockChannel!
 bind fake2.showText@node2 => mysockChannel!
….}!
!!
Figure 8.6: Changing the system at runtime using Kevscript
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9 Relation to other WPs
As mentioned in the introduction, the model-based solutions for secure software architecture devel-
oped in WP7 are meant to assist the transition between the expression of security requirements and the
actual deployment of security mechanisms on a runtime platform. In addition, some of the model-based
solutions developed here, support the formal modeling of security properties that must be checked on
the system’s model at runtime. These two elements explain the existence of strong interactions between
some prototypes developed in this workpackage and methods and tools developed in WP6 (focusing on
the expression of security requirements that must then be captured in secure models), WP8 (focusing on
the development of runtime platforms on which the models developed with WP7 solutions could be de-
ployed) and WP9 (which develops verification solutions that can be used either to verify security properties
on models or to verify that the models developed with WP7 solutions are correctly implemented).
In particular, the following connections are currently established:
• Connections with WP2: the trust and reputation framework will be bundled in the SDE. The OCL2FOL
(OCL to first order logic) module of ActionGUI is in the SDE;
• Connections with WP6: The work by Moyano et al. [35] proposes a UML profile for trust and reputa-
tion, where the requirements engineer can specify trust and reputation requirements and its relation-
ships with the business logic of the application. This work could be a natural step prior to defining
the architecture and implementation of a trust-aware application, which is what it is proposed in
this deliverable. Using the profile in D6.4, we can define the trust requirements of a system, define
the nodes and components running on these nodes, and specify the trust workings of the system.
Mapping from this requirements world to the architecture and implementation world should not be
difficult. The cloud system analysis pattern of Section 2 is used in WP 6 as a basis for creating a
method for calculating trust values in cloud computing scenarios;
• Connections with WP8: the main relation with WP8 is in the prototype of Section 7, since this tool
proposes to adapt the system at runtime, according to changes in the access control policy. This
tool strongly relies on reflexive middleware and dynamically adaptive platforms;
• Connections with WP9: There is a strong interaction between the work on ActionGUI and the early
verification task 9.1, because formal techniques are being developed in the latter to analyse Ac-
tionGUI models. The modular verification technique presented in section 3 is also related to task
9.1. Additionally, UWE’s extension (chapter 4) as part of the transformation to a Scala DSL (called
TextualUWE) and the OCL2FOL transformation are both connected to D9.4;
• Connections with WP10: the PACTS method described in Section 2 relates to WP10, because it
uses the CORAS risk analysis method in step 5 of PACTS. CORAS is a core research topic in
WP10.
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10 Conclusion
This deliverable presents advances in WP7’s development of prototype tools for secure architecture
and design. Three of these prototypes result from the integration of techniques coming from several
partners. All three collaborations have been established during the NESSoS project.
The prototypes presented here support the different activities included in the workpackage’s tasks:
• Task 7.2 Model-based decomposition of security concerns: UWE (Section 4) and ActionGUI (Sec-
tion 5) support modeling secure web applications through a clear separation between architecture
and security (access control) concerns; the framework introduced in section 8 supports modeling
trust and reputation for further integration in service-oriented architectures;
• Task 7.3 Composition and adaption of security concerns: the prototype tools presented in Section 8
and Section 7 support the dynamic reconfiguration of secure software architectures;
• Task 7.4 Reusable architectural know-how: the prototype of Section 2 supports reuse through well-
defined patterns for the design of secure cloud infrastructures; Section 3 introduces an original
technique for the efficient verification of security properties over reusable security model-based pat-
terns.
These prototypes embed initial concrete solutions to address the challenges that had been identified
at the end of year one:
• UML-based model-driven security has been strengthen through the efforts from LMU, IMDEA and
ETH. The advances in UWE and in ActionGUI offer significant contributions to the state of the art of
model-based security engineering;
• The prototype tools presented in Section 8 and Section 7 are encouraging prototypes that show the
feasibility of runtime adaptation mechanisms for RBAC policies. These prototype tool chains are
founded on advanced knowledge about dynamic adaptation in this domain (impact on requirements
and runtime system). However, more experiments are needed to evaluate the benefits of these
integrated techniques;
• Activities on reusable architecture know-how started only in year 2, leading to two prototypes. In
particular, the deployment of security architecture patterns for cloud applications will be a major
challenge for the coming period.
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